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We propose to model the exercise of self-control as the second-order choice of one’s own choice dispo-
sitions (ﬁrst-order preferences over outcomes). This choice is governed by second-order preferences
over ﬁrst-order preferences and ﬁnal outcomes. Speciﬁcally, the paper studies the revealed prefer-
ence implications of the second-order preference model for ex-ante choices among opportunity sets
in the abstract, non-probabilistic framework of Kreps (1979). While the implications of the general,
unstructured SOP model turn out to be weak, additional restrictions on the relation between ex-
post and ex-ante preferences over outcomes entail behavioral implications that distinguish the SOP
model from other models of temptation and from other explanations of negative option value such
as deliberation costs or unresolved value-conﬂicts/regret.1. INTRODUCTION
In traditional conceptions of rational choice, additional options can never be harmful since the
agent is always free not to choose them. But it has been recognized since ancient times that agents
sometimes deliberately choose to reduce their options, for example by having themselves tied to
the mast of a ship in order to prevent themselves from jumping the ship when exposed to the song
of the sirens. Such precommitment is naturally (but not uncontroversially) viewed as the rational
management of one’s own perceived irrationality.
After being introduced into economics in the classical contribution by Strotz already in 1955, this
theme has lead a surprisingly marginal existence for about 40 years, possibly because it had been
perceived as empirically atypical while perhaps intriguing philosophically. Yet this perception has
changed dramatically with the “decade of behavioral economics”, as issues of self-management have
become the topic of a rich, diverse and rapidly growing literature. Indeed, once agents are perceived
to frequently not act in their own best interests, this forces the question of how they deal with their
own irrationality squarely on the table.
There are two fundamental strategies of such self-management in the context of dynamic choices:
the agent may change his future choice sets or his future choice dispositions. We will refer to these
as the strategies of “precommitment” and “self-control”, respectively. While the great majority of
the literature following Strotz restricted attention to the strategy of precommitment, Thaler and
Shefrin (1981) formulated the ﬁrst economic model of self-control, and the seminal contribution by
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, henceforth: GP) provided the ﬁrst rigorous decision-theoretic treatment.
As noted in GP, the agent’s exercise of self-control is revealed in his dynamic choice behavior, and
more speciﬁcally in his choice among choice sets. To illustrate, think of Ulysses, approaching the
sirens but not yet able to hear them, as choosing which choice set he will face when passing the
them. In the original story involving pre-commitment, Ulysses prefers the choice set of being tied
without choice (the choice set {Tied}) to the unconstrained choice set {Tied,Jump}; in view of his
certain expectation that he would choose to jump oﬀ board in the latter case, he presumably would
have ranked that set indiﬀerent to leaving himself with no alternative but to jump (the set {Jump}),
yielding the preference pattern
{Tied}Â{ Tied,Jump} ∼ {Jump}.
By contrast, had Ulysses been more strong willed, or had the siren’s song been less tempting, he
w o u l dn o th a v en e e d e dt ot a k et h ed r a s t i cm e a s u r eo fa s k i n gt ob et i e dt ot h em a s t ;i n s t e a d ,h ec o u l d
1have roamed freely on board, relying on the force of his will-power to resist the sirens’ temptation.
Even so, the mere availability of the option to jump would have made him worse oﬀ,s i n c ei tw o u l d
have forced him to exercise his will-power.1 The exercise of self-control is thus characterized by the
distinct preference pattern
{Roam}Â{ Roam,Jump}Â{ Jump}.
While self-control shares with pure precommitment the potential undesirability of additional op-
tions, preferences based on self-control are harder to understand since the desirability of a choice set
is no longer determined by the desirability of the ultimately chosen alternative only, but also by the
utility costs arises from the non-choosing of the others.2 To achieve a satisfactory decision-theoretic
understanding of self-control, that is: of self-control preferences over menus, two issues need to be
addressed. First, which patterns of menu choices can be explained in terms of self-control, and which
cannot? What is the behavioral signature of self-control driven preferences? Second, is it possible
to give a uniﬁed, workably general account of self-control preferences?
To answer these questions, we propose in this paper an account of “self-control as second-order
preference maximization”. Its starting point is the abstract, skeletal notion of self-control as an
unobserved intra-psychic action that inﬂuences the agent’s choice dispositions at the moment of
ﬁnal (“ex-post”) choice. This action occurs at some time (“ex interim”) between the ex-ante choice
of the menu and the ex-post choice from the menu. What matters about the interim action are the
induced choice dispositions; we take these to be representable in conventional terms by a preference
ordering. The agent exercises self-control ex interim by choosing among “extended outcomes” that
consist of a physical outcome together with the preference ordering that was chosen to achieve it.
The interim choice maximizes a “second-order preference” (SOP) ranking over extended outcomes.
Ex ante, the agent chooses the menu that oﬀers the best extended outcome ex interim. The basic
modeling idea is not really new; it is essentially a one shot version of the doer-planner model of
Shefrin and Thaler (1981) and the dual self model of Fudenberg and Levine (2005).
While the conception of self-control as second-order preference maximization involves no logical
paradox3, it invites to be supplemented by some psychological or even neuro-scientiﬁc account that
1Or so the standard, somewhat narrow account goes. He might, however, have been vainglorious or reckless enough
to prefer keeping the fatal option available in order to demonstrate his strength of character.
2As in GP, think of pure commitment preferences as a limiting case of inﬁnitely costly self-control or “overwhelming
temptation”.
3Such as postulating two preference relations describing (diﬀe r e n tp a r t so f)t h ea g e n ta tt h es a m et i m e( a ss u g g e s t e d
2explains the preconditions and mechanisms of such intra-psychic causation. Here, the recently
inﬂuential distinctions between aﬀective and deliberative and between automatic and controlled
process are very promising. Indeed, these distinctions have already been explicitly invoked in support
of an SOP-like modelling of self-control by Fudenberg and Levine (2005) as well as in more detail
by Benhabib and Bisin (2004) and Loewenstein and Donoghue (2005).4 These contributions have
also demonstrated the economic relevance of SOP models of self-control by providing applications
to a wide range of economic situations. However, none of these have provided decision-theoretic
foundations, the goal of the present paper.
To do so, we study the implications of the second-order preference model for ex-ante choices
among opportunity sets (“menus”) in the abstract, non-probabilistic framework of Kreps (1979).
The revealed preference implications of the general, unstructured SOP model turn out to be crisp,
but weak: the characterizing condition called “Upper Boundedness” simply says that the union of
two menus can never be superior to both of them. This condition corresponds, in fact, to exactly
one half of GP’s central Set Betweenness axiom.5 Its bite is mainly to exclude menu preferences
based on ﬂexibility and temptation uncertainty.
The implications of the general SOP model are weak due to the absence of any restrictions on how
the agent may override ex-ante his (endogenous) ex-post preferences. For example, the unstructured
SOP model allows outcomes to be ranked ex-ante always in exactly contrary to how the agent
would rank these outcomes ex-post, based on his endogenous ex-post preferences. Such second-
order preferences may induce menu preferences in which additional options are always harmful —
menu prefernences that hardly correspond to a sensible notion of self-control.
We argue that this apparent underdetermination of the behavioral content of the SOP model can be
overcome by imposing further structure on second-order preferences that capture basic features of an
intuitive, pre-formal notion of self-control. This leads to two reﬁnements of the basic model, “second-
order preferences with self-management” and “second-order preferences with self-command”. The
latter more restrictive class of self-command preferences assumes that ex-ante outcome valuations
are independent of ex-post preferences; in this case, optimal self-control amounts to optimizing the
trade-oﬀ between achieving desirable outcomes and minimizing expenditure of will-power. Self-
for example by Shefrin and Thaler (1981))
4While Bernheim and Rangel’s (2004) distinction between cold and hot modes also appeals to such a distinction,
they do not model self control in the sense of the present paper since in their model the ex-post choice disposition is
determined by external, random cues rather than the agent himself.
5Downward Monotonicity was ﬁrst isolated by Dekel et al. (2005) under the name of “Positive Betweenness”.
3command preferences are characterized by Upper Boundedness plus a property called “Singleton
Monotonicity” which requires that an agent is never made worse oﬀ by the addition of an alternative
that is superior (as a singleton choice set) to all alternatives in the given menu.
Self-command preferences are restrictive, however, for frequently the agent will take into account
ex-ante how the outcomes are ranked ex-post. For example, in a story of optimal wishful thinking
based on endogenously chosen beliefs broadly along the lines of Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), the
agent’s ex-ante well-being would depend on the anticipatory utility derived from the endogeneously
chosen wishful beliefs. Even though the agent may know at some level that the chosen ex-post beliefs
are not rationally justiﬁable, he may sensibly take the “felicity” derived from these beliefs to be real
and thus matter ex-ante. To accommodate such situations, the broader class of self-management
preferences allows ex-ante preferences to positively reﬂect ex-post preferences; ex-post preferences
can be overruled ex-ante, but only in a consistent way. The main result of the paper (Theorem 12)
characterizes self-control preferences in terms of Upper Boundedness plus a property called Limited
Temptation. Limited Temptation is intermediate in strength between Singleton Monotonicity on
the one hand and, on the other, the requirement that every menu be at least as desirably as the
worst alternative that it contains.
Comparison to the Literature
The seminal contribution to the decision theoretic literature on self-control is the already men-
tioned paper by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, “GP”). GP provides an elegant and highly parsimonious
axiomatic model that has stimulated a sizeable and growing follow-up literature, both axiomatic and
applied. In order to achieve this parsimony and simplicity of functional form, GP deliberately sac-
riﬁced generality. It is thus of obvious interest to investigate what forms self-control driven choice
behavior can take more generally. Other papers addressing the question of generality— all couched
as generalizations of the GP model— are Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2005), Noor (2006) and
Chatterjee and Krishna (2005). The ﬁrst two will be discussed below, the last is less germane here
as it focus on temptation uncertainty.
The present paper departs from GP — and indeed from the entire axiomatic literature to date
— in its emphasis on self-control rather than temptation. In the GP model, self-control enters as
an interpretation of the obtained functional form. In point of fact, on a more straightforward
interpretation, GP menu utilities are simply the sum of a positive (ordinary) indirect utility and
4a negative (temptation) indirect utility; in other words, GP preferences could be interpreted as if
the fact of being tempted was a bad in itself, without any role for self-control. This does not mean
that a ﬂeshed-out self-control interpretation of the GP model is not possible or appropriate; indeed,
we point out below in section 3.2 that GP menu preferences can be derived from a second-order
preferences with self-command with a rather special but fairly natural structure.
GP’s emphasis on temptation rather than self-control limits the ability of the GP model to ac-
commodate important aspects of the exercise of self-control. First of all, one very robust feature of
optimal self-control will be its responsiveness to the incentives for self-control, i.e. to the gains in
outcome utility relative to the eﬀort of will-power. As we show in an adaptation of the model by
Benhabib and Bisin (2004), this will typically lead to ex-post choice behavior that violates standard
context-independence (or choice “consistency”) conditions. By contrast, an important part of the
simplicity of the GP model is the implicit assumption of context-independent ex-post choice6.I n
a related vein, Fudenberg and Levine (2005) have observed that cognitive load eﬀects suggested in
the psychological and experimental literature such as Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) and Muraven and
Baumeister (2000) lead to failures of context-independence.
Second, if one embeds the GP model within the SOP model, it turns out that the ex-post prefer-
ences implicit in GP menu preferences must violate standard well-behavedness assumptions such as
preference convexity or the expected-utility hypothesis; see section 3.5. We interpret this ﬁnding as
suggesting that the GP model implies a particular kind of self-control through desire repression as
opposed to self-control through desire modiﬁcation.
Third, being a model of self-command, the GP does not allow ex-ante outcomes to depend on
ex-post preferences, as discussed above.
Both Dekel et al. (2005) and Noor (2006) generalize the GP model, the ﬁrst by introducing
multiple temptations, and the second by making the strength of temptations menu-dependent. Both
contributions retain the emphasis on temptation rather than self-control, and end up characterizing
classes of menu preferences that are very diﬀerent from the class of self-control and self-command
preferences at the center of this paper. Along with GP, they also assume that the agent has
well-deﬁned preferences over menus of lotteries rather than menus of abstract alternatives.
Dekel et al. (2005) retain GP’s Independence axiom but weaken their Set Betweenness axiom;
6More rigorously, of context-independence of the ex-post choice behavior suggested by the functional form and
appealed to in its interpretation. This implied context-independence comes to the fore axiomatically in their recent
2006 paper which presents a lottery-free counterpart to the original GP paper.
5indeed, in the case of deterministic temptation on which we shall focus as it overlaps with the goals
of the present paper,7 they weaken Set Betweenness to the Upper Boundedness axiom described
above. The Independence axiom applied to menus of lotteries is very strong; among other things, it
implies context-independence of ex-post choices, which, as mentioned above, is severely restrictive
from a self-control perspective. Indeed, as pointed out by Fudenberg and Levine (2005), if self-
control is understood as a “missing action” that co-determines the realized value of a menu, the
Independence axiom is problematic for essentially the same reason for which it is inapplicable in
the case of ordinary lottery preferences with a missing action; see Machina (1984) and Mas-Collel,
Whinston and Green (1995). As observed in section 6, multiple temptations preferences typically
violate Singleton Monotonicity and Limited Temptation and, by consequence, do not admit a well-
behaved self-control interpretation in the sense of the present paper.
Noor (2006) presents various examples to show that context-independence of implied choices is
seriously restrictive. He thus drops Independence, and weakens Set Betweenness quite drastically.
Noor’s representation allows temptations to be context-dependent; while the resulting model is very
ﬂexible, it does not yield or suggest much structure since the context-dependence of temptations is
left unexplained. By contrast, in the present paper, the context-dependence of choices is derived
from the maximization of a context-independent second-order preference ordering. Menu preferences
in his model may easily violate both Upper Boundedness and Limited Temptation.
At the methodological level, all of the above contributions characterize preferences over menus of
lotteries, rather than generic, abstract “alternatives” as done here. Reference to lotteries is avoided
in the present paper because lotteries are extraneous to the notion of self-control, and because the
purpose of the present paper is to characterize the implications of conceptualizing self-control as
second-order preference maximization in general. At a more pragmatic level, avoidance of any a
priori structure on alternatives allows one to obtain results for (small) ﬁnite domains of menus. This
enhances the testability of the model in practice, and also makes the assumption of a well-deﬁned
complete preference ordering over menus more plausible.8
The perhaps most troublesome feature of the SOP model (at the level of generality considered here)
is the absence of interesting uniqueness properties; the interest in such properties presumably was a
main driver behind the use of the lottery framework in the above contributions and the willingness
7Their paper is substantially more general by also allowing for uncertainty of the temptation.
8Gul-Pesendorfer (2006) axiomatize a ﬁnite, lottery-free counterpart to their earlier representation.
6to impose sometimes very strong assumptions in that framework. We view the non-uniqueness of
the representation not as fatal deﬁciency of the model but as an inescapble “fact of life”, a (not
inconsiderable) technical inconvience and an interesting research question. First and foremost, the
appeal of the model does not come exclusively, or even primarily, from a representation theorem,
but from the conceptually compelling view of self-control as an unobserved psychic action. It is thus
no accident that versions of the SOP model have been employed before in mentioned contributions
of Shefrin and Thaler (1981), Benhabib and Bisin (2004) and Fudenberg and Levine (2005) prior to
any axiomatization.
The absence of useful uniqueness properties is due partly to the lack of structure on the alternatives
and partly to the lack of structure imposed on second-order preferences. It will be an important
topic for future research to explore to what extent interesting uniqueness results can be obtained
in special cases. One interesting such special case would be based on assumption that all feasible
preferences over lotteries have the expected-utility form. Preliminary investigations suggest that, at
least in particular subcases, uniqueness is obtainable.
2. SECOND-ORDER PREFERENCES
The behavioral primitive is a ranking (weak order) % over a domain M of opportunity sets or
“menus”. Menus A,B,... are simply sets of alternatives taken from some ﬁnite ground set X.T h e
domain M will generally be assumed to be comprehensive, that is: to contain all singletons and to
contain any subset of any set it contains (A ∈ M implies B ∈ M for any B ⊆ A). Thus M might
consist of all non-empty subsets of X, or of possibly much smaller subfamilies such as the set Mm
of all menus of cardinality not exceeding m, with m =2or 3. This generality is helpful since much
of the intuition and presumably practical testability will come from choices among menus of small
cardinality.
The second-order preference (SOP) model explains menu preferences as follows. At date 2 (“ex
post”), the agent chooses an alternative from the menu A b a s e do nt h eﬁrst-order preference (choice
disposition) P over X; to ensure single-valued ex-post choices, P is assumed to be a linear order.9
The ﬁrst-order preference ordering P, is itself chosen “ex interim”, after the menu A had been
chosen at date 1 (“ex ante”). The interim choice of P in turn is based on the agent’s second-order
9A linear order is a transitive, complete and anti-symmetric relation, that is: a weak order with only trivial
indiﬀerences of the form xPx.
7preference relation D over “extended outcomes” (x,P) ∈ X ×L(X), where L(X) is the set of linear
orders on X. Thus, the agent cares about not only the ultimate physical outcome x, but also about
the choice-disposition P he “chose” or “formed” in order to obtain that outcome. The relation D
is assumed to be a weak order on X ×L (X) that is numerically represented by a “second-order
utility function” V . Second-order strict preference and indiﬀerence will be denoted by B and ≡,
respectively.
Ex-interim, when forming P, the agent anticipates that he will end up choosing the P-maximal
alternative in AP(A); as usual, x = P(A) iﬀ xPy for all y ∈ A.H et h u sf o r m sP to obtain the best
extended outcome (P(A),P). Likewise, when choosing among menus ex-ante, the agent evaluates
menus according to the best extended outcome (P(A),P) they enable.10 That is, the agent ranks
menus according to
A % B iﬀ argmax
D
{(P(A),P):P ∈ L(X)} D argmax
D
{(P(B),P):P ∈ L(X)}. (1)
Equivalently, there exists a menu-utility function U : M → R representing menu preferences % such
that
U(A)= m a x
P∈L(X)
V (P(A),P); (2)





u(x,A)= m a x
P:P(A)=x
V (x,P). (4)
The expression (3) represents the menu ranking as an indirect utility based on the context-
dependent u(x,A), and (4) explains this context-dependence in terms of the “incentive compatibility
constraint” {P : P(A)=x}.T h e d i ﬀerence u(x) − u(x,A) can be thought of as the “cost of self-
control” associated with implementing x; as expanding the set A will tighten incentive compatibility
the constraint, this cost will weakly increase in A for ﬁxed x.11
10The assumption that ex-ante and ex-interim choices are based on the same second-order preference ordering is
restrictive; one can imagine situations (especially when there is a large temporal gap between the menu and the
outcome choices) in which ex-ante the agent anticipates excessive or misguided self-control eﬀorts ex-interim (e.g. out
of compulsiveness). To incorporate this, one could allow for third- and higher-order preference orderings, at the price
of signiﬁcant losses in the tractability and explanatory content of the model.
11The cost of self-control K(x,A)=u(x) − u(x,A) plays an important role in the exposition of Fudenberg-Levine
(2005). However, in contrast to the present paper, the general model of FL (adapted to the present framework) allows
8The scenario underlying self-control through second-order preferences is summarized by the fol-
lowing time line.
Time Line
Date Choice of Choice based on
Ex ante A D
Ex interim P D
Ex post x P
A few related pieces of notation will be helpful. For any A ∈ M,
• the set of (ex-interim) feasible extended outcomes is denoted by
YA := {(P(A),P): ,P∈ L(X)};
• the set of (possibly) chosen extended outcomes is
H(A): =a r gm a x D YA = {(x,P) ∈ YA :( x,P) D (x0,P0) for all (x0,P0) ∈ YA},a n d
• the set of (possibly) ex-post chosen alternatives is
C(A): ={x :( x,P) ∈ H(A) for some P ∈ L(X)}.
Also, we will denote the restriction of % to singletons by %1; %1 describes the agent’s commitment
preferences which reﬂect his ex-ante valuation of outcomes in the absence of self-control issues.
To illustrate how second-order preferences rationalize menu preferences, consider the simplest
instance of self-control, namely the menu preference
{a}Â{ a,b}Â{ b},
with X = {a,b}.
These preferences are rationalized by the following SOP,
(a,ba) B (a,ab) B (b,ba) B (b,ab),
ap a r t i c u l a rﬁrst-order preference P being denoted by listing the alternatives in decreasing order (here
and throughout the rest of the paper). In the above SOP, it takes eﬀort reﬂected in reduced second-
order utility to induce a ﬁrst-order preference for a over b : (a,ba) B (a,ab); moreover, this eﬀort
V also to depend directly on the choice set A. As a result, the self-control cost function K in FL does not need to
satisfy this monotonicity property, nor any further restrictions entailed by the functional form (4).
9is worthwhile since (a,ab) B (b,ba). Thus, the extended outcome choices are H({a})={(a,ba)},
H({b})={(b,ba)}, and H ({a,b})={(a,ab)}.S i n c eH({a}) B H ({a,b}) B H({b}), these lead to
the menu preferences {a}Â{ a,b}Â{ b}.
The ex-post choice function C induced by a given second-order preference ordering D can be
interpreted in two ways. First, and most straightforwardly, C can stand for the agent’s actual ex-
post choices. As such, C is behaviorally observable, and could thus legitimately have been included
among the primitives. We have abstained from doing so to make the model directly comparable to
the existing decision-theoretic literature on self-control, but also because under natural assumptions
the implied choices are uniquely determined by menu preferences, as we will show in a companion
paper.12
Alternatively, C (and H) could be interpreted as the agent’s point expectations governing his
interim preference formation. These may diﬀer from his actual choices if the agent is mistaken about
the ex-post choice dispositions that in fact result from a particular internal self-control action. For
example, the agent may naively believe that he would act in line with his ex-ante preferences over
outcomes (and thus fail to exhibit any desire to precommit), only to succumb to temptation once
faced with the actual choice. While the ﬁrst interpretation assumes that the agent is “sophisticated”
in correctly forecasting the eﬀect of his self-control actions on the resulting choice dispositions, the
second interpretation is neutral on how sophisticated or naive the agent in fact is; for models of
dynamic choice that allow for partially sophisticated agents, see O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999,
2001).




the context-dependence of u suggests that one should not expect C itself to satisfy standard choice-
consistency/context-independence conditions such as IIA13. And, indeed, we will encounter many
natural violations of IIA in the sequel. We note that the implied choices in the GP model, as well
as in Dekel et al. (2005) and Noor (2006), also satisfy (5).
12In particular, it can be shown that if the menu preference satisfyies Limited Temptation and is derived from a
linear second-order preference ordering, the resulting choice-function is uniquely determined. As the role of linearity
throws up additional conceptual and technical issues, we do not include this material here.
13IIA says that if an alternative is chosen in a larger set, then it must also be chosen in any smaller set in which
it is feasible; formally, for any x,A,B such that B ⊆ A : x ∈ C(A) ∩ B implies x ∈ C(B). We will identify context-
dependence with IIA throughout.
10As a matter of psychological technology, it is clear that an agent will typically not be able to get
himself to form arbitrary ex-post choice-dispositions, no matter which self-control tactics he engages
in. Infeasibility of a choice disposition is behaviorally equivalent to assuming it to be prohibitively
costly. In terms of the SOP ordering D,t h i si sc a p t u r e db yd e e m i n gt h eﬁrst-order preference P
infeasible if there exists Q ∈ L(X) such that, for all x,y ∈ X, (x,Q) B (y,P); we will denote the
complementary set of feasible preferences by P.
A limiting case obtains when the agent cannot inﬂuence his future choice dispostions at all which
is captured by the existence of a unique feasible preference (P = {P}). In this case, menus are
ranked according to
A % B whenever {P(A)} % {P(B)}.
We will call such menu preferences “menu preferences without self-control ”.14 In the special case
in which ex-ante and ex-post outcome preferences agree (P =%1), menus are ranked according to
their indirect utility.
3. EXAMPLES
To illustrate the explanatory power of the SOP model, we will now present a number of examples
some of which are closely related to models in the literature. To focus on the central trade-oﬀ
between achieving ex-ante optimal outcomes and economizing on self-control costs, all of them will
adopt the following additively separable functional form:
V (x,P)=u(x) − k(P), (6)
for appropriate functions u(.) and k(.) such that minP∈L(X) k(P)=0 . The disutility k(P) can be
interpreted as the “cost of will-power” of adopting P w h i c hi st r a d e do ﬀ against the direct utility of
the physical outcome u(x); infeasible preferences are those with k(P)=∞. If there is a unique cost-
minimal preference P, this preference can be interpreted as the choice disposition resulting from the
agent’s automatic decision-processes in the absence of any self-control eﬀorts, and will be referred
to as the agent’s default preference ordering D. We will show that even in very simple cases, (6)
leads to interesting phenomena that violate basic assumptions of the GP model.
14GP refer to this as “temptation without self-control” or “overwhelming temptation”.
113.1. Fixed costs of cognitive control
The simplest specialization of the additively separable SOP model (6) results from the existence of
only two feasible preferences, P = {Q,D},w i t hQ ranking alternatives according to their ex-ante util-
ity u, k(D)=0 , and γ = k(Q) > 0 denoting the ﬁxed cost of acting according to Q; this is essentially
a static version of the model of Benhabib-Bisin (2004) who applied it a dynamic consumption-savings
problem. Benhabib-Bisin provide a detailed motivation inspired by neuroscience, interpreting γ as
the ﬁxed cost of switching from automatic to controlled cognitive processes; with a somewhat diﬀer-
ent spin, one can interpret γ as the ﬁxed cost of breaking the “hot” aﬀect provoked by the situation
and acting with a cold head.
To illustrate the behavioral implicatins of the model, suppose that the agent has a mild problem
with excessive alcohol consumption, without being genuinely addicted. Let X = {0,...,L}, with
x denoting the amount of alcohol (in milliliter) consumed over a speciﬁed time interval (e.g. an
evening). D ranks the elements of X in increasing order: that is, the agent’s default tendency is to
consume as much alcohol as possible. On the other hand, Q and u(.) rank X in decreasing order
(with u(x)=−x): ex ante (before the party has begun), the agent views alcohol consumption as a
bad. It takes him γ>1 utiles of eﬀort to act on the ex-ante preferences. This results in the following
choice behavior: if faced with a choice among similar amounts of alcohol (if maxA − minA<γ ),
the agent lets himself go and follows his default penchant for more alcohol; on the other hand, he
will never end up drinking more than γ ml more than unavoidable.





maxA if maxA − minA<γ
minA if maxA − minA ≥ γ
,
and menus are ranked according to
U(A)=m a x ( −maxA,−minA − γ).
Note in particular that ex-post choices are context-dependent: observed choices from menus with
small stakes (maxA − minA<γ ) appear to reveal a preference for ever larger amounts of alcohol;
but this preference is contradicted by his self-restraint when the stakes are suﬃciently large (maxA−
minA ≥ γ).15
15In the GP model which builds in context-independent ex-post choice, this is replicated in mistaken inferences on
menu-preferences: observing the menu preferences {x}Â{ x,x+1} ∼ {x+1}Â{ x+1,x+2} ∼ {x+2}Â..., ,t h e s e
12The message of this example is robust. It is a fundamental intuition about optimally economizing
on self-control that the amount of self-control exerted will increase with the stakes (in terms of
outcome utility gained). With the exertion of more self-control, the ex-post choice dispositions will
be increasingly brought into line with ex-ante preferences over outcomes. Due to this systematic shift
of the adopted ex-post preference with the choice set, one would expect the induced choice-function
to exhibit context-dependence.
3.2. A non-linear generalization of the GP model
Heuristically, it can be instructive to think of the cost of will-power in forming P as being deter-
mined by the “distance” of P from the default preference D, w i t ht h ed i s t a n c em e a s u r i n gt h ee x t e n t
to which D must be distorted to obtain P. Formally, this involves writing
k(P)=φ(d(P,D)). (7)
A natural speciﬁcation of such a metric d yields a non-linear generalization of the GP model. The
metric relies on a ﬁxed cardinal utility function uD representing the default preference D. This allows
o n et om e a s u r et h ed i s t a n c eo fP from D as the minimal amount by how much outcome utilities
must change in order to transform D into P. Formally, let
d(P,D): = i n f
e u:e u represents P
sup
x∈X
|e u(x) − uD(x)|. (8)








Equation (9) obtains since, in order to make x top-ranked in A, under (8) the perceived utility
of x needs to be lifted vis-a-vis the best default choice argmaxy∈A uD(A) by at least uD(x) −
maxy∈A uD(A) (+ arbitrarily small  ).
If φ is the identity, (9) yields the GP representation, with ex-post choices maximizing
u(x)+uD(x),
satisfying context-independence. As pointed out by Fudenberg-Levine (2005), with non-linear φ,
this context-independence is lost. They argue in particular that the notion of will-power as using
rankings would lead one to infer that menus are ranked in inverse order of their maximal element, i.e. according to
U(A)=−maxA, which is wide oﬀ the mark.
13scarce cognitive resources suggests that φ should be convex rather than linear. Note also that the






0 if v =0 .
We view the SOP model’s ability to embed the GP in a fairly simple and transparent way as an
indication of its unifying potential.16
While the ﬁxed-costs model and the non-linear extension of the GP model entail interesting
departures from the original GP model, these departures remain fairly modest, since they retain the
key simplifying feature that the context-dependent utility of an alternative depends on the menu only
via the “most tempting” alternative(s) argmaxy∈A uD(A).17 By consequence, such menu-preferences
continue to satisfy GP’s central Set Betweenness axiom.18 This axiom has two parts which we shall
refer to as Upper and Lower Boundedness.19
Axiom 1 (Upper Boundedness) For all A,B ∈ M: A ∪ B - A or A ∪ B - B.
Axiom 2 (Lower Boundedness) For all A,B ∈ M: A ∪ B % A or A ∪ B % B.
The ﬁrst condition is fundamental; it reﬂects the negative context-dependence that is built into
the SOP model and will turn out to characterize it; cf. Theorem 3 below. By contrast, the second
condition is quite special and may easily be violated, as the following two examples will show.
3.3. Multiple temptations
Say that an alternative x tempts in the menu A if A Â A\{x}, that is: if the agent would want
to commit not to choose x from A. Lower Boundedness is easily seen to imply that every menu
contains at most one tempting alternative. This is a key to the simpliﬁcation of the GP model, but
it is clearly restrictive as illustrated by the following example.
16Admittedly, this embedding is at this point heuristic and lacks a rigorous articulation, for example in terms of
axiomatic conditions on second-order preferences. Such an articulation would presumably have to be formulated in a
lottery framework as in the original GP paper.
17This is Assumption 5 (“Opportunity Based Cost of Self-Control”) in Fudenberg-Levine (2005).
18See Fudenberg-Levine (Theorem 5).
19DLR, which were the ﬁrst to formally separate these two conditions, refer to them as Positive and Negative
Betweenness, respectively. We chose to depart from their nomenclature, since one half of a “betweenness” condition
has no betweenness left in it at all, and since the positive vs. negative distinction is speciﬁct ot h e i rm o d e l .
14Consider the following pair of preferences over dessert menus based on the alternatives no dessert,
light dessert, heavy dessert;20 here and elsewhere, starred alternatives indicate the choices implied
by the subsequent explanation of the preferences:
{none
∗,h e a v y } Â {none, light
∗} Â {none, light
∗,h e a v y },a n d
{none, light
∗} Â {none, light
∗,h e a v y } .
Lower Boundedness is violated since the two alternatives “light” and “heavy” are both tempting
in the menu {none, light, heavy}. A natural story is the following. Our agent, a weight-watching
dessert lover, is tempted by a heavy desert, but can resist this temptation easily as he is just too
aware of the conﬂict with his long-term interest in weight-control. Thus the menu {none, heavy} is
just slightly worse than the ability to commit to no dessert at all (the menu {none}). On the other
hand, the temptation by a light dessert is a strong one: the ‘voice of reason’ speaks only mutedly
since a light dessert is not so bad, and our agent is a dessert lover after all. Thus, if the light dessert
is available, he will take it, leaving him worse oﬀ than had he been tempted by a heavy dessert only;
in partiuclar, {none, heavy}Â{none, light}. However, if both desserts are available, he will now need
to exercise some will-power not to fall for the heavy dessert, leading to the menu-preference {none,
light}Â{none, light, heavy}.
This story can be captured in the additively separable SOP model as follows. There are two
feasible preferences Q and D over the alternatives {n, ,h}, with  QnQh and hD Dn. The outcome
utilities are u(n)=4 ,u ( )=2 ,u (h)=0 , and preference disutilities are k(Q)=1and k(D)=0 .
One the easily computes
U({n,h})=V (n,Q)=3>U({n, })=V ( ,D)=2>U({n, ,h})=V ( ,Q)=1 ,
rationalizing the above preferences.
3.4. Multiple tasks
Consider an agent faced with a number of prima-facie unrelated choices each of which requires
the exercise of self-control. To keep things simple, each of these choices will be binary. For example,
20The same preference pattern with a somewhat diﬀerent story has been discussed before by Dekel et al. (2005).
Indeed, GP already envisioned this and related violations of Set Betweenness quite clearly (GP, p. 1408-1409); they
state that “we rule out these more elaborate formulations of temptation, as well as other deviations from the standard
model, to stay close enough to the standard model so that the diﬀerence in behavior can be attributed solely to the
presence of temptation.”
15the agent may be faced with the choice whether or not to keep his diet, whether or not to exercise,
whether or not to keep moderation in drinking, etc. The choices are related indirectly through the
use of “will-power” as general-purpose resource that is in limited supply and used up by the exercise
of self-control. This notion of will-power as a limited resource has been proposed by Muraven, Tice
and Baumeister (1998) and modeled in economics by Ozdenoren, Salant and Silverman (2006); see
also Loewenstein and Donoghue (2005). It leads to the prediction that demands on self-control in
certain tasks reduce the extent of self-control in others. Ozdenoren et al. argue that this prediction
corresponds to stylized facts about people’s observed life-style choices, in particular to the fact that
much of the individual variation in health-related self-control behaviors concerns less the overall
number of areas in which an individual exhibits self-control problems than the particular areas in
which these show up. In contrast to the formalism but not the spirit of their model, the following
model explicitly captures the notion of will-power being used up by choices involving self-control
(e.g. of the choice to exercise rather than to enjoy leisure) rather than particular activities (e.g. the
activity of exercising itself).
In this toy model, there is a set J of activities the agent can choose to engage in or not; this choice
is simultaneous. An alternative is thus a vector of zeros and ones, x ∈ X = {0,1}J. Commitment
preferences are strictly monotone; in the absence of self-control problems, an agent is thus always
better oﬀ doing the activity than not doing it. On the other hand, choosing to do this activity
requires the expenditure of one unit of will-power. This can be modeled in the SOP framework as
follows.
The intrinsic unrelatedness of the tasks is captured by assuming that all feasible preferences P ∈ P
are weakly separable. That is, for all P ∈ P, the following condition holds:
(1,x −j)P(0,x −j) iﬀ (1,y −j)P(0,y −j), for all j ∈ J,x,y ∈ {0,1}J.
This condition states that, for each feasible preference P ∈ P, one can say whether or not the
agent prefers to do a particular activity j irrespective of what else he does. The default preference is
to be disposed against any particular activity. Acquiring a disposition in favor of an activity requires
a unit of will-power; this leads to a cost of will-power function on P of the following form:
k(P)=e k(#{j :( 1 ,y −j)P(0,y −j)}),
where y ∈ {0,1}J is an arbitrary vector of activities.






0 if e ≤ e,
∞ if e>e,
with 1 < e<#J.
This case is of particular interest since it implies that all costs of self-control are opportunity costs.
Note in particular that it implies that, for all pairs x,y, {x,y} ∼ {x} or {x,y} ∼ {y},ap r o p e r t y
which characterizes within the GP model the class of menu preferences without self-control.
The speciﬁed second-order preferences lead to menu preferences that violate Lower Boundedness
and thereby Set Betweenness. In particular, since 1 < e, the agent can costlessly exercise self-control
if faced with only a single activity choice at a time; with 1 denoting the vector (1,..,1), one thus has
{1} ∼ {1,(0,1−j)} for all j. (10)
On the other hand, if one enables the agent to opt out of any particular activity at the same time,
the agent would lack the will-power to resist each time, thereby ending up worse oﬀ ex-ante:
{1}Â{ 1} ∪ {(0,1−j)}j∈J; (11)
Clearly, (10) and (11) are inconsistent with a repeated application of Lower Boundedness. If
e =# J − 1
2, for example, each alternative in A = {1} ∪ {(0,1−j)}j∈J is tempting in A except the
alternative 1.
3.5. Self-Control by Modiﬁcation of Desire vs. Self-Control by Repression of Tempta-
tion
The specialness of GP’s approach emerges especially clearly in economic settings in which the
space of alternatives is endowed with additional structure, especially linear structure. Thus, let X
denote a ﬁnite subset of Rn, and M a comprehensive set of menus in X.
For concreteness, consider an agent’s choice of two-period consumption streams x =( x2,x 3); at
date 1, the agent chooses a menu of consumption streams, and at date 2, he chooses a consumption
stream over this and the following period. In this set-up, we can model the standard issue of present-
bias: in the absence of self-control eﬀorts, the agent’s ex-post choice is characterized by a high degree
of impatience, resulting in small savings and small future (date 3) consumption. Ex-ante, the agent
prefers more future consumption and would thus like to commit to more saving. Alternatively, he
might exercise self-control by forming more patient ex-post preferences.
17This can be naturally modeled in the SOP approach as follows. Feasible preferences Pδ ∈ P
are parametrized by a discount factor δ ∈ [δ∗,δ
∗] ⊆ [0,1], where δ∗ denotes the “default” and δ
∗
the (ex-ante) “ideal” discount factor; the ﬁxed temporal utility from consumption is given by a
strictly increasing and strictly concave utility function h : R+ → R.S o Pδ is given via its utility
representation uδ by
uδ(x)=h(x1)+δh(x2).
Second-order preferences are given by the second-order utility function
V (x,Pδ)=uδ∗(x) − k(δ),
where k :[ δ∗,δ
∗] → R+ is non-decreasing in δ, with k(δ∗)=0and k(δ) > 0 if δ>0. For expositional
speciﬁcity, we will assume that ex post in the absence of self-control the agent cares only about
present consumption (δ∗ =0 ) , but is perfectly patient ex ante (δ
∗ =1 ) . Consider the agent’s
preferences over menus composed of the consumption streams a = (100,100),b= (150,50), and
c = (200,0). Clearly, uδ∗(a) >u δ∗(b) >u δ∗(c). Thus, assuming the costs of will-power k(.) to
be suﬃciently low, consumption streams with greater present consumption tempt those with less
present consumption, but this temptation is resisted, i.e.
{a}Â{ a,b}Â{ b}Â{ b,c}Â{ c}. (12)
Now compare the ranking of the missing sets {a,c} and {a,b,c} implied by this preference pattern
within the SOP model to the ranking implied by the GP model. In the SOP model, it follows from
the convexity of feasible preferences alone that
{a,b} - {a,b,c} - {a,c}, (13)
hence that neither adding c to b nor substituting c for b can do any harm.
To see this, note that the assumption that the temptation of higher present consumption is resisted
at {a,b} (i.e. {a,b}Â{ b}) implies that the agent will chose a in {a,b}, together with an appropriate
preference P implementing a, i.e. (a,P) ∈ H({a,b}) with aPb.F r o mt h ec o n v e x i t yo fP, it follows
that aPc, hence that the extended outcome (a,P) is feasible in {a,b,c} and {a,c} as well. By
implication, in both {a,b,c} and {a,c} the agent is able to do at least as well as in {a,b}. Finally,
Upper Boundedness allows one to infer that {a,b,c} - {a,c}, completing the veriﬁcation of (13).
Furthermore, in the SOP model, it will typically be the case that
{a,b} ∼ {a,b,c} ≺ {a,c};
18indeed, in the present example, this will happen whenever will-power costs k(δ) are strictly in-
creasing. For in this case the agent will want to implement the preferred consumption stream with
the minimum amount of self-control, i.e. with the lowest discount factor δ, that will do the job. This
lowest discount factor is strictly smaller in {a,c} than in {a,b}.T h u s ,b, the “local competitor” to
the chosen alternative a, is tempting in {a,b,c}, while the “globally largest temptation” c is not.







Here, consumption streams with larger present consumption are construed as more tempting rather
than less; in particular, the preference pattern (12) implies that t(c) >t (b).T h i si nt u r ni m p l i e st h e
ranking
{a,b}Â{ a,b,c} ∼ {a,c}, (15)
which is incompatible with (13). In particular, now c is tempting in {a,b,c}, but b is not.
This incompatibility is robust, and does not hinge on the linearity of the GP representation. In
particular, it extends to the non-linear generalization (9) proposed by Fudenberg-Levine (2005) with
strictly increasing k, where one has21
{a,b}Â{ a,b,c} % {a,c}. (16)
The contrast between the rankings (13) and (16) reveals a fundamental diﬀerence in the logic of
the SOP model with convex feasible preferences and GP style models. To put it in a slogan, in the
former “all temptation is local” while in the latter “all temptation is global”.
Does this diﬀerence have a deeper meaning in terms of the nature of the implied mechanism of
self-control? Since the GP model can be embedded fairly naturally in the SOP model as pointed
out above, the diﬀerence cannot be attributed to a fundamental incompatibility of the two models
as such. Instead, it is better accounted for within the SOP model as a diﬀerence between two types
of second-order preferences. From this perspective, the inconsistency between (13) and (16) implies
that GP style menu preferences are based on the formation of non-convex ex-post preferences. In the
consumption-savings problem above, for example, this means that GP-style self-control cannot be
21The only point of contact between the two models is the Benhabib-Bisin (2004) model which is a limiting case
of both, with k weakly but not strictly increasing in either representation. In that model, (12) implies that {a,b} ∼
{a,b,c} ∼ {a,c}.
19u n d e r s t o o da sa ne x - i n t e r i mm o d i ﬁcation of agent’s discount factors. Likewise, in a setting in which
the alternatives are lotteries of ﬁnal outcomes, it implies that a GP agent in this setting cannot have
ex-post preferences of the expected-utility form.22
There is an element of paradox here. Why should ex-post preferences be systematically diﬀerent
in character from ex-ante preferences? While these observations do not disqualify GP-style menu
preferences per se as a model of self-control, they seem to show that the associated ex-post preferences
cannot be understood as coherent expressions of a coherent ex-post desire, hence that GP-style
self-control cannot be understood as eﬀortful modiﬁcation of such desire (e.g. of the rate of time
preference).23
If not as modiﬁcation of desire, how can GP-style self-control understood then? To obtain a
tentative answer, it is suggestive to consult the SOP rationalization of GP-style menu preferences
oﬀered in (8). It implies that a given alternative x can be optimally implemented in a menu A
by a transformation of the default/temptation preference D that consists in lifting x just above
the D-maximal alternative in A, leaving all other rankings as in D. Such a transformation can be
viewed as the minimal change of D that enables the agent to choose x in A; by construction, it is
highly speciﬁct oA, and is targeted to x, the intended choice, alone. By contrast, a modiﬁcation of
some underlying desire would in some systematic fashion aﬀect the ranking of other alternatives as
well, especially (under convexity) of locally competing ones. The targeted lifting of x is thus better
interpreted as a repression of the “temptation” originating from the default preference rather than
as the expression of a modiﬁed desire.
At an intuitive level, the distinction between these two modes of self-control seems quite appealing,
and seems to track diﬀerences in real-word self-control problems. Self-control by repression may
apply in cases in which the self-control problem originates in visceral impulses, in which the default
desire demands gratiﬁcation within a very short time horizon, and in which the ex post decision
is cognitively simple. Choices among desserts at dinner would seem to ﬁtt h i sp a t t e r n ,a sw o u l d
choices concerning the consumption of addictive goods, spontaneous shopping decisions, crimes of
passion or opportunity, and surely many others.
22This statement is meaningful only within the SOP model, of course, in which ex-post preferences are endogeneous
and depend on the menu. It is not contradicted by the fact that the revealed preference relation deﬁned from the
ex-post choice function C implied by GP menu preferences has the EU form. The latter is a derivative construct in
the SOP model.
23For a diﬀerent self-control account of the GP model with implied stochastic rather than deterministic ex-post
choices, see Benaubou-Pycia (2002).
20By contrast, self-control by desire modiﬁcation should be more appropriate in situations in which
the self-control problem originates in uneducated instincts or habits, in which the consequences of
the ex-post decision are spread out over time, and in which the decision requires some planning or
deliberation. Here, modiﬁcation of desires through visualization of long-term consequences, deliber-
ate weighing of pros and cons, detachment from emotion are plausible mechanisms of self-control.
The life-time consumption-savings problem faced by most people would appear to fall in this cate-
gory; other examples may be attempts to loosen or overcome the grip of decision traps such as loss
aversion, regret avoidance, overconﬁdence, and wishful thinking; the transformation of dietary and
ﬁtness habits; etc. .
Obviously, these oﬀ-the-bat considerations are at best suggestive and deserve more careful elab-
oration. On the theoretical side, one obvious dimension requiring further attention is the dynamic
one. In particular, the establishment of personal rules is a major mechanisms of self-control, and the
distinction from and interaction with the repression and modiﬁcation modes of self-control would
need to be clariﬁed. The dynamic dimension is all the more important inasmuch the modiﬁcation
(and sometimes also the repression) of desire will frequently have lasting eﬀects, thus endowing
self-control with the characteristics of an investment decision. On the empirical side, it would be
important to relate these distinctions to extant distinctions in the psychological literature. Within
the author’s limited knowledge, the distinction between hot and cold states is perhaps the most
closely relevant.
4. GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SOP MODEL
SOP rationalizable menu preferences are characterized by the Upper Boundedness property intro-
duced above which requires that for any menus A,B ∈ M, the union A ∪ B is weakly inferior than
one of the two. Upper Boundedness captures the principle that “unchosen alternatives can never
help”. Indeed, suppose the agent expects to choose from the menu A ∪ B an alternative x in A .
Then he could have achieved the same outcome x in the menu A with the same ex-post preference
P, hence with the same self-control eﬀort; thus A % A ∪ B.
Thus Upper Boundedness is clearly necessary for SOP rationalizability. Less obviously, it is also
suﬃcient.
Theorem 3 On comprehensive M, the menu-preference % is SOP rationalizable if and only if it
satisﬁes Upper Boundedness.
21Upper Boundedness implies that no menu can be superior to the best alternative it contains, and
thus excludes “preferences for ﬂexibility” a la Kreps (1979). As pointed out by Dekel et al. (2005),
beyond that Upper Boundedness also conﬂicts with “temptation uncertainty”, which can be viewed
as introducing a secondary preference for ﬂexibility.24 25
While a natural implication of self-control, Upper Boundedness is satisﬁed by many menu prefer-
ences that do not seem to naturally explicable in terms of self-control considerations. For example,
a ranking of menus according to their inverse cardinality (that is: A % B iﬀ #A ≤ #B) is upper-
bounded, but seems diﬃcult to explain in terms of such considerations. Central to the notion of
self-control is the opposition of ex-ante interests and ex-post temptations. From this perspective, it
is hard to see how in some particular menu every alternative could be tempting, let alone how this
could happen in every non-singleton menu as it does in the inverse cardinality ordering. In other
words, it seems plausible to expect self-control-driven preferences to satisfy (at least) the following
condition.
Condition 4 For no A ∈ M it is the case that, for all x ∈ A, A ≺ A\x.
If this is accepted, it means that the unstructured, bare-bones SOP model contains many second-
order preference orderings that admit a self-control interpretation in at best a rather contrived
sense. For example, the inverse-cardinality ranking described above is rationalized by second-order
preferences represented by
V (x,P)=# {z : zPx}.
Notice that this second-order preference ranks two extended outcomes (x,P) and (y,P) in strict
opposition to there ranking by P itself: (x,P) D (y,P) if and only if yPx. While it is true that one
can imagine certain diabolic or masochistic fantasies giving rise to such second-order preferences,
their intuitive contradiction to any well-deﬁned notions of self and self-interest makes it questionable
whether such stories are meaningfully classiﬁed under the rubric of self-control.
In the following, we will therefore consider various “soundness” conditions on second-order pref-
erences and show how they give rise to restrictions on menu preferences that entail Condition 4. In
24To see this, consider X = {a,b,c}, with commitment preferences {a}Â{ b}Â{ c}. Due to temptation uncertainty,
it may easily happen that {a,b,c}Â{ a,c}Â{ b}, in violation of Upper Boundedness. This will happen if c is tempting
a with low probability, and if the agent is able to resist this temptation by choosing b but not by choosing a. Adding b
to {a,c} is valuable as a stop-gap measure in case temptation strikes, even though {b} is inferior to {a,c} in isolation.
25See also Chatterjee and Krishna (2005) for a worked out model of menu-preferences driven by uncertainty about
future temptations.
22particular, we will show that the most generally applicable and compelling such condition, Limited
Temptation, is characterized by a slight strengthening of Condition 4, thereby establishing a match
between self-control-driven preferences over menus and well-structured second-order preferences over
extended outcomes.
5. STRUCTURING THE SOP MODEL
In well-behaved second-order preferences, the evaluation of outcomes conditional on hypothetical
ex-post preferences P (i.e. comparisons of the form (x,P) versus (y,P)) will be related to the
content of those preferences. At one end of the spectrum, the conditional preferences “fully reﬂect”
the ex-post preferences P.
Assumption 5 (Full Reﬂection) (x,P) D (y,P) whenever xPy.
Since Full Reﬂection rules out any conﬂict of interest between the ex-ante and ex-post selves, it
entails an indirect utility ranking of menus, with commitment preferences given by {x} % {y} iﬀ
argmax
D
{(x,P):P ∈ L(X)} D argmax
D
{(y,P):P ∈ L(X)}.
While fully reﬂective preferences have no non-standard implications for preferences over menus as
such, they may be interesting to study for their non-standard implications for preferences over the
alternatives themselves. For example, in an intertemporal context, Becker and Mulligan (1997)
model an agent who optimally chooses his discount rate, and whose second-order preferences satisfy
Full Reﬂection.
The polar opposite of Full Reﬂection is the following assumption of Anti-Reﬂection.
Assumption 6 (Anti-Reﬂection, preliminary version) There exists a weak order W
such that (x,P) D (y,P) whenever xWy, a n ds u c ht h a t(x,P) B (y,P) whenever xWy and not
yWx.
Anti-Reﬂection requires that, conditional on any P, outcomes are ranked according to a ﬁxed
“well-being” ordering W that is independent of the hypothetically formed ex-post preferences P.
It captures the idea that the ex-ante self has a ﬁxed, well-deﬁned view of what beneﬁts the agent
overall; any modiﬁcation of P has only the purpose of steering ex-post behavior in the right direction,
23but does not inﬂuence the ex-ante perceived beneﬁt. In view of this imperious attitude toward the
ex-post self, we will call such second-order and menu preferences preferences “with self-command”.
An important example of second-order preferences with self-command are the additively separable
ones of Section 3 characterized by a representation of the form V (x,P)=u(x) − k(P).
It is easily veriﬁed that, under Anti-Reﬂection, the ordering W must coincide with the induced
commitment preference %1.26 Thus, to simplify the further exposition, one can replace W by %1
in the statement of Anti-Reﬂection. This leads to the following condition in which we additionally
drop the strict part for technical reasons.27
Assumption 7 (Anti-Reﬂection) (x,P) D (y,P) whenever {x} % {y}.
Intermediate between and generalizing these two polar cases is the following assumption of Partial
Reﬂection. We will refer to the associated second-order and menu preferences as preferences “with
self-management”.
Assumption 8 (Partial Reﬂection) There exists a weak order W on X such that
(x,P) D (y,P) whenever xPy and xWy. (17)
In contrast to Full Reﬂection, Partial Reﬂection allows ex-post preferences to be overruled due
to the existence of an ex-ante interest factor W that is ignored ex-post. And in contrast to Anti-
Reﬂection, Partial Reﬂection allows ﬁrst-order preferences P to inﬂuence the conditional valuation;
that is, P is viewed by the ex-ante self not merely as causally determining which outcome is ultimately
chosen, but also as contributing to the ex-ante desirability of that outcome. This will make sense in
many cases: even if the ex-ante self views P as rationally deﬁcient (infected by bias etc.), diﬀerent ex-
post preferences P will be accompanied by distinct psychological states of desire leading to distinct
levels of desire-satisfaction. The actual enjoyment from a given culinary indulgence, for example,
may be greatly reduced by accompanying worries about future weight-consequences. It is reasonable
26To see that under Anti-Reﬂection, {x} % {y} whenever xWy, take (y,P) ∈ H({y}), (x,Q) ∈ H({x}), and xWy.
By Anti-Reﬂection, (x,P) D (y,P). Since also (x,Q) D (x,P), one obtains (x,Q) D (y,P), i.e. {x} % {y}.
27The latter move makes no diﬀerence in the absence of non-trivial indiﬀerences among singletons, a very common
and not an unreasonable assumption in a ﬁnite setting.
To achieve a version of Theorem 10 for the stronger, “preliminary” version of Anti-Reﬂection, one would need to
obtain a version of Theorem 17 in the Appendix that extends the asymmetric component of the given relation R0;
this does not appear to be straightforward.
24for the ex-ante self to count this reduction of enjoyment as a real loss in well-being. In a related
vein, Ainslie (2001) strongly emphasizes the “loss of appetite” as a major potential downside of the
exercise of self-control.28
An interesting example of second-order preferences in the literature is Brunnermeier-Parker’s
(2005) theory of “optimal expectations” (see also Gollier 2005). Adapted to the present setting, it
yields a theory of “optimal wishful thinking”.29 In a nutshell, in this theory ex-post preferences are
determined by endogenously chosen subjective beliefs π. The ex-ante valuation of an act fV (f,π)
is made up of two components, the “anticipatory utility” Eπu(f) (pertaining to the time interval
preceding the resolution of the uncertainty) and the expected “realized utility” (pertaining to the
time interval following the resolution of the uncertainty) Eπ∗u(f), the latter expectation being taken
with respect to a ﬁxed ex-ante probability π∗,
V (f,π)=Eπu(f)+δEπ∗u(f),
for some appropriate weighting factor δ>0. By contrast, ex-post preferences P use ex-post beliefs
to evaluate both components; hence they rank acts according to Eπu(f)+δEπu(f), i.e. according
to Eπu(f).W i t hW given by Eπ∗u(f), the second-order preferences associated with V (f,π) satisfy
Partial Reﬂection. Note that optimal-expectation based preferences are driven by a diﬀerent type
of trade-oﬀ than self-command preferences are: here, the cost of forming preferences in line with
ex-ante beliefs is the opportunity cost of lost anticipatory utility, not the direct cost of self-control
eﬀort.
28As in the case of Anti-Reﬂection, it is of interest to eliminate the reference to the extraneous primitive W in the
statement of the Partial Reﬂection assumption. This can be done as follows. Deﬁne a relation WD on outcomes by
setting xWDy iﬀ (x,P) B (y,P) and yPx; WD summarizes all instances in which ﬁrst-order preferences over outcomes
are overriden ex-ante by conditional second-order preferences. Partial Reﬂection assumes that such overriding occurs
in a consistent manner reﬂecting the existence of a consistent, well-deﬁned iterest that is taken into account ex-ante
but ignored ex post. Appealing to a ﬁnite version of Szpilrain’s theorem, Partial Reﬂection as deﬁn e di nt h et e x ti s
easily seen to be equivalent to acyclicity of WD. A conceptual advantage of this reformulation is the absence of any
completeness requirement on WD ; note that Full Reﬂection, for example, is equivalent to WD being empty.
29Brunnermeier-Parker (2005) themselves interpret the choice of π as occurring behind the agent’s back, for instance
as made by “evolution”.
By contrast, Epstein and Kopylov (2006) model an agent who anticipates temptation by wishful thinking (referred to
by Epstein and Kopylov as minimization of ‘cognitive dissonance’; however, menu preferences have a GP-like tempation
representation of the form (9) (with linear φ) and have thus a natural SOP rationalization with self-command.
256. CHARACTERIZATIONS
Let us now turn to the restrictions on menu preferences implied by these axioms. Self-command
preferences turn out to be characterized by the following axiom.
Axiom 9 (Singleton Monotonicity) If {x} % {y} for all y ∈ A, then A ∪ {x} % A.
Singleton Monotonicity is an intuitively transparent implication of self-command: clearly, if the
a g e n tc h o o s e st os w i t c ht ot h ee x - a n t es u p e r i o ra l t e r n a t i v ex ‘voluntarily’ (at the original level of
self-control) , that’s beneﬁcial ex-ante as well, if not, no harm is done. More pedantically, if menu
preferences are SOP rationalizable, for an additional alternative x to hurt, x musts render the
extended outcome(s) (y,P) chosen in A infeasible; this happens if and only if x is preferred to y
under P. But in that case the extended outcome (x,P) is be feasible in A∪{x}30. Since under Anti-
Reﬂection this extended outcome is weakly preferred to the originally chosen one, (x,P) D (y,P).
The addition of x does no harm after all, and A ∪ {x} % A, as asserted by Singleton Monotonicity.
Theorem 10 On comprehensive M, % is rationalizable by a second-order preference satisfying Anti-
Reﬂection if and only if it satisﬁes Upper Boundedness and Singleton Monotonicity.
In the presence of Upper Boundedness, Singleton Monotonicity is implied by Lower Boundedness.
As the examples in section 3.3 and 3.4 have shown, it is much weaker.31
In contrast to self-command preferences, self-management preferences do not need to satisfy Sin-
gleton Monotonicity. The above derivation does not go through since the ex-ante self may now be
made worse oﬀ b yas w i t c ht ot h ea l t e r n a t i v ex; while superior in isolation (hence without the need
for self-control), under Partial Reﬂection x need not be superior when self-control is exercised. In
other words, the above argument breaks down since (x,P) may be second-order inferior to (y,P)
(since y may well be ex-ante superior to x in terms of W).
The argument can be resurrected, however, if based on W rather than commitment preferences
%1. Suppose D satisﬁes Partial Reﬂection with respect to W,a n dt h a txWy for all y ∈ A.T h e ni f
the agent prefers to switch from y to x at P, this switch is ex-ante beneﬁcial, since by assumption
x is also superior to y in terms of W; otherwise, no harm is done. Putting this slightly diﬀerently,
30Strictly speaking, in YA∪{x}, of course.
31Note that Singleton Monotonicity weakens Lower Boundedness in two ways: ﬁrst, the added menu is required to
be a singleton, and second, this singleton needs to be weakly superior to any existing alternative as a singleton, not
merely superior to the existing menu as a set (A - {x}). (Upper Boundedness ensures that A - {y} for some y ∈ A).
26if D satisﬁes Partial Reﬂection with respect to W, then a W-maximal alternative in A cannot be
tempting in A or any of its subsets. Thus, leaving W unspeciﬁed, any A contains an alternative x
such that x is tempting neither in A nor in any of its subsets. This is expressed by the following
axiom of Limited Temptation.
Axiom 11 (Limited Temptation) For all A ∈ M, there exists x ∈ A such that, for all
B ∈ M : x ∈ B ⊆ A, B\x - B.
Limited Temptation in fact characterizes self-management preferences.
Theorem 12 On comprehensive M, % is rationalizable by a second-order preference satisfying
Partial Reﬂection if and only if it satisﬁes Upper Boundedness and Limited Temptation.
To illustrate the diﬀerence between self-command and self-control preferences over menus, consider
the following example with 3 alternatives, X = {a,b,c}. Schematically, b is “safe”; c is disastrous and
requires self-control to be avoided; a is irresistible vis-a-vis b and greatly rewarding in the absence of
self-control eﬀorts, but much less so in their presence. Menu-preferences and implied ex-post choices
are as follows:
{a} ∼ {a,b∗}Â{ b} % {b∗,c}Â{ a∗,b,c} ∼ {a∗,c}Â{ c}. (18)
These menu preferences evidently satisfy Limited Temptation;32 on the other hand, Singleton-
Monotonicity is violated, since adding {a} to the menu {b,c} makes the agent worse oﬀ.T h i s
happens because while a is ex-ante superior to b when the agent can commit to either alternative
and self-control eﬀorts are therefore unnecessary, a is ex-ante inferior to b when c is feasible and
self-control eﬀorts are required to avoid it.
The preferences in (18) can be rationalized by second-order preferences with self-management as
follows. There are two feasible preferences, D (“loose”) and Q (“stern”), with the rankings cDaDb
and aQbQc. Extended outcomes are ranked as follows:
(a,D) B (b,D) B (b,Q) B (a,Q) B (c,D) B (c,Q).
In choices among singletons, the agent will always adopt D; this implies in particular that H({a})=
(a,D) B (b,D)=H({b}) and thus {a}Â{ b}. But in the presence of the disastrous alternative
c, the agent needs to exercise self-control and switch to Q in order to avoid a choice of c ex-post.
32Simply note that b is not tempting in {a,b,c}.
27Since b is better than a given Q, this implies H({b,c})=( b,Q) B H({a,b,c})=( a,Q) and thus
{a,b,c} ≺ {b,c}, in violation of Singleton Monotonicity.
The schematically described preference pattern can arise in a variety of contexts. As usual, a
dieting story can be told. But other scenarios may be more interesting. Consider, for example,
the decision problem of an agent on the verge of an extramarital aﬀair. Self-control being a topic
with strong Victorian overtones, it may be appropriate to link to the tradition of Madame Bovary,
Anna Karenina and Eﬃe Briest and refer to this agent as “wife” named Chloe; the presence of
the third alternative a, however, gives the story a more contemporary feel. Chloe anticipates a
meeting with the fancied (and presumed to be willing) “date”, a meeting at which many things are
possible. The impending aﬀair may not materialize (“b”); it may become an fully-ﬂedged, deeply
involved relationship (“c”), with dire consequences for her marriage; ﬁnally, it could take the form
of a (possibly exciting) short-term ﬂing (“a”) which would not endanger the marriage but would
come at the price of some lies and bites of conscience. Chloe can now, alone, shape the plot with
a cool head by two means: by precommitments that preclude certain outcomes to develop, and by
deciding on the state of mind with which she enters the encounter: she could stay guarded, mindful
of the priority of her marriage at any time; or she could fully open herself to passion. According
to the stated preference relation, Chloe’s ideal extended outcome would be a passionate ﬂing (a,D).
The reader is invited to ﬁll in the missing details of the story him- or herself.
Judging from the models and examples that can be found in the literature, natural counterex-
amples to Limited Temptation which satisfy Upper Boundedness tend to be associated with coun-
terexamples to the following more elementary condition of Weak Lower Boundedness which says any
menu is weakly preferred to the worst alternative it contains.
Axiom 13 (Weak Lower Boundedness) For all A ∈ M,t h e r ee x i s t sx ∈ A such that
A % {x}.
Since Weak Lower Boundedness seems compelling a priori as a necessary condition property
of menu-preferences driven by self-control considerations, this observation further strengthens the
intuitive appeal of Limited Temptation and tends to support an identiﬁcation of menu preferences
driven by self-control considerations with menu preferences preferences “with self-management” as
deﬁned here.
28An interesting example of menu preferences violating Weak Lower Boundedness is Dekel et al.s




(vi (x) − max
y∈A
vi (y)).
Weak Lower Boundedness will be violated in this model whenever there exist alternatives x and y and





since then {x} ∼ {y}Â{ x,y}. In the lottery framework underlying the model, such pairs of lotteries
fail to exist only for menu preferences with rather special structure.33 It follows that, in contrast
to the GP model, multiple temptation preferences typically cannot be rationalized by second-order
preferences with self-management. This may not be very surprising since there is an important
disanalogy in the notion of temptation in GP and DLR: while the single temptation utility in GP
can be interpreted in the SOP model as the default choice disposition that would govern ex-post
choices in the absence of self-control eﬀorts, no such interpretation is available for the multiple
simultaneous temptations in the DLR model.34
33Indeed, the menu preferences speciﬁed by Dekel et al. to explain the example of section 3.3 above violate Lower
Boundedness.
34See also Sarver (2005) who proposes a reinterpretation of the multiple temptations model in terms of anticipated
regret.
29APPENDIX: PROOFS
A1. Background: Indirect Utility on General Domains
We will begin with a result on indirect utility orderings on general, unstructured domains. Let Z
a domain of “elements”, and S ⊆ 2Z\∅ a domain of sets, with ≥ aw e a ko r d e ro nS.T h e r e s u l t
will be applied to the case of Z = X ×L (X) and S = {YA : A ∈ M}, with YA := {(P(A),P):
P ∈ L(X)}. To ease into it, we will begin with a special case.
Axiom 14 If ∪Bi ⊇ A, then, for some i, Bi ≥ A.
Proposition 15 ≥ satisﬁes Axiom 14 if and only if there exists a weak order R on Z such that
A ≥ B iﬀ (argmax RA)R(argmax RB).
Proof. Special case of Theorem 17 below.
The result to be shown strengthens Axiom 14 to guarantee that the weak order R on Z extends
a given partial order (transitive and reﬂexive relation) R0. Deﬁne D(S,R0): ={x ∈ Z| for some
y ∈ S : yR0x}.
Axiom 16 If D(∪Bi,R 0) ⊇ A, that is: if, for all x ∈ X there exists y ∈∪ Bi such that yR0x, then
,f o rs o m ei, Bi ≥ A.
Theorem 17 ≥ satisﬁes Axiom 16 if and only if there exists a weak order R ⊇ R0 on Z such that
A ≥ B iﬀ (argmax RA)R(argmax RB).
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Necessity is obvious. For suﬃciency, let
YM := {x ∈ Z|for no B,A ∈ M : A>Band x ∈ D(B,R0)}. (19)
The construction of R is based on the following Lemma.
Lemma 18 S ≥ T for all T ∈ M if and only if YM ∩ S 6= ∅.
Proof of Lemma. Evidently, if S is not ≥− t o pr a n k e dt h e nS ∩ YM = ∅ (simply set B = S,
and choose A>S ; such A exists by the completeness of ≥).
30Conversely, suppose that S ∩YM = ∅. Then, by the deﬁnition of YM, for each x ∈ S, there exist
menus Bx and Ax in M such that i) x ∈ D(Bx,R 0), and ii) Ax >B x. By Axiom 16 and i), for some
x ∈ S, S ≤ Bx. By ii), therefore also S<A x, showing that S is not ≥− top ranked. ¤
Construct the ranking R as follows. Deﬁne inductively a nested sequence {Mk} in M by setting
M1 := M and Mk := {S ∈ Mk−1 : S ∩ YMk−1 = ∅}. Note that, by construction, the {YMk} form
a partition of Z. For x ∈ YMk and y ∈ YMk0, deﬁne
xRy if and only if k ≤ k0.
Let ≥R denote theIU ordering induced by R; we claim that ≥=≥R and R ⊇ R0.
For the ﬁrst claim, S is ≥− t o pr a n k e di fa n do n l yS ∩ YM 6= ∅ by Lemma 18 which holds if and
only if S is ≥R −top ranked by the construction of R.T h u s≥=≥R by a straightforward inductive
argument.
Clearly, for any x,y such that yR0x, by the transitivity of R0, for any k, x ∈ YMk implies y ∈ YMk,
hence x ∈ YMk and y ∈ YMk0 imply k0 ≤ k, establishing yRx as desired. ¥
A2. A Master-Result for Menu-Preferences
We now apply Theorem 17 to sets of extended outcomes. Say that a partial order D0 on X×L(X)
is outcome-based if (x,P) D0 (y,Q) implies P = Q, for all x,y,P,Q.
Given a menu preference %, deﬁne the induced preference %Y over “menus of extended outcomes”
Y ∈ Y by
Y %Y Y 0 whenever there exist A,B ∈ M such that Y = YA and Y 0 = YB and A % B;
note that the A and B referred to in this deﬁnition are unique.
Axiom 19 Let {Bi}i∈I be an arbitrary family of menus and A ∈ M. If, for all P ∈ L(X),t h e r e
exists i such that (P(Bi),P) D0 (P(A),P), then Bi % A for some i ∈ I.
Theorem 20 (Master Theorem) Suppose that the partial order D0 is outcome-based. Then
% has a SOP rationalization such that D⊇D0 if and only if it satisﬁes Axiom 19.
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31From the deﬁnition of D,
D(∪YBi,D0)={(x,P) ∈ X ×L (X)|for some (y,Q) ∈∪ YBi :( y,Q) D0 (x,P)};
by the outcome-basedness of D0, one can assume that Q = P in the r.h.s. . It follows that
D(∪YBi,D0) ⊇ YA if and only if for all P ∈ L(X),t h e r ee x i s t si such that (P(Bi),P) D0 (P(A),P).
Hence %Y satisﬁes Axiom 16 if and only if % satisﬁes Axiom 19. Theorem 20 thus follows immediately
from Theorem 17. ¥
Theorem 20 provides a schematic master result that will now be used obtain the three main results
of the paper by plugging in three diﬀerent speciﬁcations of D0 and simplifying the corresponding
version of Axiom 19.
A3. Existence of a General SOP Representation
We ﬁrst derive a version of Theorem 3 for arbitrary domains of menus, taking D=D∅, where D∅
is the “vacuous” (reﬂexive) relation given by
(x,P) D∅ (y,Q) if and only if x = y and P = Q.
Axiom 21 Let {Bi}i∈I be an arbitrary family of menus and A ∈ M.I fA = ∪iBi,t h e nBi % A for
some i ∈ I.
Theorem 22 On arbitrary M, % on M has a SOP representation if and only if satisﬁes Axiom
21.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 2 . In view of the deﬁnition of D∅, the result is an immediate conse-
quence of the Master Theorem (Theorem 20) and the following Lemma.
Lemma 23 The following two statements are equivalent:
i) For all P ∈ L(X), P(A) ∈ {P(Bi)}i∈I;
ii) A = ∪iBi.
Proof of Lemma.
ii) implies i). Immediate from fact that P linear order.
i) implies ii). Suppose that ii) is false. Then there exists x ∈ A such that, for all Bi 3 x, Bi\A 6= ∅.
Let P ∈ L(X) be such that P(A)=x and such that yPz whenever y ∈ Ac and z ∈ A.S i n c e b y
32assumption Bi\A 6= ∅ whenever x ∈ Bi, then by the construction of P one has P(Bi) ∈ Ac ⊆ {x}c;
on the other hand, if x/ ∈ Bi, trivially P(Bi) 6= x. It follows that {P(Bi)}i∈I ⊆ {x}c. ¤¥
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Theorem 3 is an immediate consequence of the following Lemma.
Lemma 24 If M is comprehensive, Axiom 21 is equivalent to Upper Boundedness.
Proof. Upper Boundedness is evidently a special case of Axiom 21. To see that it in fact
implies Axiom 21 if M is comprehensive, take any family {Bi} and A such that A = ∪iBi. Assume
w.l.o.g. that B1 % B2 % ... % Bn. By comprehensiveness of M,t h es e t sCj :=
S
i≤j Bi are contained
in M. By Upper Boundedness, B1 = C1 % C2 % ... % Cn = A. ¤¥
A4. Second-Order Preferences with Self-Command
Let W be a partial order on X, and deﬁne the outcome-based partial order DW on X ×L(X) by
(x,P) DW (y,Q) if and only if xWy and P = Q.
Say that Bα -covers x for A if x ∈ B and, for all y ∈ B\A, yWx; Bβ -covers x for A if x/ ∈ B
and, for all y ∈ B, yWx; and B covers x for A if Bα -covers x for A or Bβ -covers x for A.
Axiom 25 If for all x ∈ A there exists i such that Bi covers x for A, then for some i, Bi % A.
Axiom 26 (W-Addition) If xWy for all y ∈ A, then A ∪ {x} % A.
Axiom 27 (W-Substitution) if yWx for all y ∈ A, then {x} - A.
Theorem 28 i) % on arbitrary M has a SOP representation with D⊇DW if and only if satisﬁes
Axiom 25.
ii) If W is a weak order, % on comprehensive M has a SOP representation with D⊇DW if and
only if it satisﬁes Upper Boundedness, W-Addition and W-Substitution.
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The result is an immediate consequence of the Master Theorem (Theorem 20) combined with
Lemma 29 below.
33Lemma 29 The following two statements are equivalent for arbitrary A and {Bi}:
i) For all P ∈ L(X),t h e r ee x i s t si ∈ I such that P(Bi) WP (A);
ii) For all x ∈ A, there exists i ∈ I such that Bi covers x for A.
Proof of Lemma.
ii) implies i).
Take any P ∈ L(X) and Bi such that Bi covers P(A) for A.
Case i): P(A) ∈ Bi. Then, by choice consistency, P(Bi) ∈ P(A)∪(Bi\A) whence P(Bi) WP (A)
since Bi α-covers x.
Case ii): P(A) / ∈ Bi.T h e nP(Bi) WP (A) since Bi β-covers x.
i) implies ii).
Proof via modus tollens. Fix some x ∈ A that is not covered by any Bi.L e tJ = {i ∈ I : Bi 3 x}.
Thus, by deﬁnition, for any i ∈ J, there exists zi ∈ Bi\A such that not ziWx (*),
and, for any i ∈ I\J, there exists zi ∈ Bi such that not ziWx (**).
Let Z be a selection of such zi,Z:= {zi : i ∈ I}. Let P be a linear ordering that ranks alternatives
as follows: First, the alternatives in the set Z ∩ Ac, in arbitrary order. Second, x.T h i r d , t h e
alternatives in the set Z ∩ A. Fourth, all other alternatives.
By construction, for any z ∈ Z and y ∈ X : if yPz then y ∈ Z ∪ {x}; hence, for all i ∈ I,
P(Bi) ∈ Z ∪ {x}.
We claim that for all i ∈ I,P(Bi) 6= x, hence P(Bi) ∈ Z. Indeed, for i such that x ∈ Bi,z i ∈ Bi\A
by (*), whence ziPxby the deﬁnition of P, and thus P(Bi) 6= x. On the other hand, for i such that
x/ ∈ Bi, trivially if P(Bi) 6= x. Since therefore P(Bi) ∈ Z for all i ∈ I, for no i ∈ I, P(Bi) Wxby
(*) and (**). Since also x = P(A) by the construction of P,f o rn oi ∈ I, P(Bi) WP (A), as desired.
¤
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This follows immediately from Part i) and Lemma 30 below.
Lemma 30 If M is comprehensive and W is a weak order % satisﬁes Axioms 25 if and only if it
satisﬁes Upper Boundedness, W-Addition and W-Substitution.
Proof of Lemma.
34Necessity is straightforward. For suﬃciency, suppose that, for all x ∈ A, there exists i such that
Bi W-covers x for A. We need to show that, for some i ∈ I, Bi % A.
For i ∈ I, let Ci = {x ∈ A∩Bi : yWx for all y ∈ Bi\A}, and let C1 = {Ci}i∈I. Also, let C2 denote
the family of singletons {x} for x ∈ A such that, there exists i ∈ I such that yWx for all y ∈ Bi.
By the hypothesis on the family {Bi}, evidently
[
(C1 ∪ C2)=A. By Upper Boundedness, com-
prehensiveness of M and Lemma 24, therefore C % A for some C ∈ C1 ∪ C2.
If C = Ci ∈ C1, in view of Lemma 31,i) just below and since W is a weak order, by W-Addition
Bi % C, hence Bi % A by transitivity.
On the other hand, if C = {x} ∈ C2, by the deﬁnition of C2 there exists i ∈ I, such that yWx
for all y ∈ Bi. In view of Lemma 31,ii) just below and since W is a weak order, by W-Substitution
Bi % C, hence Bi % A by transitivity. ¤
Lemma 31 Suppose M is comprehensive and W is a weak order. Then
i) % satisﬁes W-Addition if and only if B % A whenever, for all x ∈ A, B α-covers x for A;
ii) % satisﬁes W-Substitution if and only if B % A whenever, for all x ∈ A, B β-covers x for A.
The straightforward proof is left to the reader. ¥
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Theorem 10 follows immediately from substituting the commitment ordering %1 for W in part
ii) of Theorem 28 together with the observation that Singleton Monotonicity (i.e. %1-Addition)
implies %1-Substitution, which, for weak orders %, is easily seen to be equivalent to Weak Lower
Boundedness. ¥
A5. Second-Order Preferences with Self-Management
Again, let W be a partial order on X, and deﬁne the outcome-based partial order DWP on
X ×L(X) by
(x,P) DWP (y,Q) if and only if xWy, xPy and P = Q.
Axiom 32 If, for all x ∈ A, there exists i such that Bi α-covers x for A, then for some i, Bi % A.
Theorem 33 i) % on arbitrary M has a SOP representation with D⊇DWP if and only if satisﬁes
Axiom 32.
35ii) If W is a weak order, % on comprehensive M has a SOP representation with D⊇DWP if and
only if satisﬁes Upper Boundedness and W-Addition.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 3 ,P a r ti ) .The result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 20 com-
bined with the following Lemma.
Lemma 34 The following two statements are equivalent for arbitrary A and {Bi}:
i) For all P ∈ L(X),t h e r ee x i s t si ∈ I such that P(Bi) WP (A) and P(Bi) PP (A);
ii) For all x ∈ A, there exists i ∈ I such that Bi α-covers x for A.
Proof of Lemma.
ii) implies i).
Take any P ∈ L(X) and Bi such that Bi α-covers P(A) for A. Since P(A) ∈ Bi,P (Bi) P
P(A). Moreover, by choice consistency, P(Bi) ⊆ P(A) ∪ (Bi\A) whence P(Bi) WP (A) as well by
α-coverage.
i) implies ii). Proof via modus tollens.
Fix some x ∈ A that is not α-covered by any Bi.
Let J := {i ∈ I : Bi 3 x}. By assumption, for any i ∈ J, there exists zi ∈ Bi\A such that not
ziWx. Let Z be a selection of such zi,Z:= {zi : i ∈ J}.
Let P be an ordering that ranks alternatives as follows: First, the alternatives in the set Z, in
arbitrary order. Second, x. Third, all other alternatives, in arbitrary order. Evidently, since Z ⊆ Ac,
x = P(A).
By construction, for any i ∈ I such that Bi ∩ Z 6= ∅,P (Bi) ∈ Z by choice consistency, and
therefore not P(Bi) WP (A). On the other hand, for any i ∈ I such that Bi ∩ Z = ∅,x/ ∈ Bi by
the deﬁnition of P; hence from the construction of P, not P(Bi) PP (A).
Thus for no i ∈ I, P(Bi) W ∩ PP (A). ¤
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 3 ,P a r ti i ) .ii) follows immediately from Part i) and the following Lemma.
Lemma 35 If M is comprehensive and W is a weak order, % satisﬁes Axioms 32 if and only if it
satisﬁes Upper Boundedness and W-Addition.
Proof of Lemma.
Necessity is straightforward. For suﬃciency, suppose that, for all x ∈ A, there exists i ∈ I such
that Bi α-covers x for A. We need to show that, for some i, Bi % A.
36For i ∈ I, let Ci = {x ∈ A ∩ Bi : yWx for all y ∈ Bi\A}. By the hypothesis on the family {Bi},
∪Ci = A. By Upper Boundedness, comprehensiveness of M and Lemma 24, therefore Ci % A for
some i ∈ I. In view of Lemma 31, i), by the deﬁnition of Ci,W-Addition and the fact that W is a
weak order, Bi % Ci, hence Bi % A by transitivity. ¤¥
The proof of Theorem 12 relies on the following general result on “acyclic indirect utility repre-
sentations”. Let S denote a family of non-empty subsets of some ﬁnite set Z, and > be a relation
on S.
Theorem 36 The following two statements are equivalent:
i) There exists a linear order P such that
A>Bimplies (argmax PA)P (argmax PB)
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The implication from i) to ii) is straightforward.
The converse is proved by induction on the cardinality of Z. The claim is trivial for #Z =1 ;
s u p p o s et h a ti ti ss a t i s ﬁed for #Z ≤ n − 1. Consider > on Z with #Z = n. From ii), it is evident
that there is z∗ ∈ Z such that there do not exist A,B ∈ 2Z\{∅} with z∗ ∈ B and A>B .
Consider now the preference relation >∗ on Z∗ := Z\{z∗} deﬁned as the restriction of > to
Z\{z∗}, i.e. , for any A,B ∈ 2Z\{z∗}\{∅},
A> ∗ B if and only if A>B .
Evidently, >∗ satisﬁes ii). By induction assumption, there exists a linear order P∗ on Z\{z∗} such
that, for any A,B ∈ 2Z\{z∗}\{∅},
A>Bimplies (argmax P ∗A)P∗ (argmax P ∗B).
Let P be the linear order on Z uniquely deﬁned by putting z∗ on top, and equal to P∗ on Z\{z∗}.
Evidently, A>Bimplies B ∈ 2Z\{z
∗}\{∅} by deﬁnition of z∗. Since also trivially A ∈ 2Z\{z
∗}\{∅}
or A 3 z∗, we therefore have, for any A,B ∈ 2Z\{∅},
A>Bimplies (argmax PA)P (argmax PB),
as desired. ¤
37P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 2 .
The necessity of Limited Temptation has been shown in the text.
Deﬁne A>{x} iﬀ A∪{x} ≺ A. By Limited Temptation, for any family {Ai} and {xi} such that




i{xi} 6= ∅. For evidently, if to the contrary
S
Ai ⊆ {xi}i∈I, then
Limited Temptation would fail at the menu {xi}i∈I. Hence by Theorem 36 above, there exists a
linear order W such that, for any A ∈ M, and x ∈ X, A ∪ {x} ≺ A implies that there exists y ∈ A
such that yW ˙ x. Arguing by modus tollens, this means that % satisﬁes W−Addition. Hence the
existence of a partially reﬂective second-order preference D rationalizing % follows from Theorem
28. ¥
38REFERENCES
[1] Ainslie, G. (2001): “Breakdown of the Will”, Cambridge University Press.
[2] Becker, G. and C.B. Mulligan (1997): “The endogenous determination of time preference,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 112, 729–758.
[3] Benabou, R. and M. Pycia (2002): “Dynamic Inconsistency and Self-Control,” Economics Letters
77, 419-424.
[4] Benabou, R. and J. Tirole (2004): “Willpower and Personal Rules,” Journal of Political Economy,
112, 848-887.
[5] Benhabib, J. and A. Bisin (2005): “Modelling Internal Commitment-Mechanisms and Self-Control:
A Neuroeconomics Approach to Consumption-Savings Decisions”, Games and Economic Be-
havior 52, 460-492.
[6] Bernheim, B.D. and A. Rangel (2004): “Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision Processes,” mimeo,
forthcoming in the American Economic Review.
[7] Brunnermeier, M. and J. Parker (2005): “Optimal Expectations”, American Economic Review,
95(4), 1092-1118.
[8] Epstein, L. and I. Kopylov (2005): “Cognitive Dissonance and Choice”, University of Rochester
Working Paper.
[9] Chatterjee, K. and V. Krishna (2005): “Menu Choice, Environmental Cues and Temptation: A
‘Dual Self" Approach to Self-Control’, Penn State University Working Paper.
[10] Dekel, E., B. Lipman and A. Rusticini (2005): “Temptation-Driven Preferences”, Boston University
Working Paper.
[11] Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine (2005): “A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control”, Harvard University
Working Paper, forthcoming in the American Economic Review.
[12] Gollier, C. (2004): “Optimal Positive Thinking and Decisions under Risk”, mimeo Toulouse.
[13] Gul, F. and W. Pesendorfer (2001): “Temptation and Self-Control”, Econometrica 69, 1403-1435.
[14] Gul, F. and W. Pesendorfer (2006): “The Simple Theory of Temptation,” mimeo Princeton.
39[15] Kopylov, I. (2005): “Temptations in General Settings”, mimeo.
[16] Kreps, D. (1979): “A Representation Theorem for ’Preference for Flexibility’,” Econometrica 47,
565-577.
[17] Krusell, P, Kuruscu, B. and T. Smith (2005): “Temptation and Taxation,” mimeo Princeton.
[18] Loewenstein, G. and O’Donoghue, E. (2005): “Animal Spirits: Aﬀective and Deliberative Processes
in Economic Behavior”, mimeo.
[19] Machina, M. (1984) “Temporal Risk and the Nature of Induced Preferences,” Journal of Economic
Theory 33 199-231.
[20] Mas-Colell, A. , Whinston, M. and J. Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press.
[21] Miao, J. (2005) “Option Exercise with Temptation,” mimeo, Boston University.
[22] Muraven, M, and R. Baumeister (2000) “Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited Resources: Does
Self-Control Resemble a Muscle?” Psychological Bulletin, 126, 27-259.
[23] Muraven, M, D. Tice, and R. Baumeister (1998) “Self-Control as a Limited Resource,” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 774-789.
[24] Noor, J. (2005) “Temptation, Welfare and Revealed Preferences,” mimeo, Rochester.
[25] Noor, J. (2006): “Menu-Dependent Self-Control”, Boston University Working Paper.
[26] O’Donoghue, T. and M. Rabin (1999): “Doing it Now or Doing it Later,” American Economic
Review 89, 103-124.
[27] O’Donoghue, T. and M. Rabin (2001): “Choice and Procrastination,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 121-160.
[28] Ozdenoren, E., S. Salant and D. Dan Silverman (2006): “Willpower and the Optimal Control of
Visceral Urges,” Institute for Advanced Study working paper #69.
[29] Sarver, T. (2005): “Anticipating Regret: Why Fewer Options May Be Better”, mimeo.
[30] Sen, A. (1971): “Choice Functions and Revealed Preference”, Review of Economic Studies 38, 307-
317.
40[31] Shiv, B. and A. Fedorikhin (1999): “Heart and Mind in Conﬂict: The Interplay of Aﬀect and
Cognition in Consumer Decision Making”, Journal of Consumer Research 26, 72-89.
[32] Strotz, R. H. (1955): “Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization”, Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 23, 165-180.
[33] Thaler, R. and H.M. Shefrin (1981): “An Economic Theory of Self-Control,” Journal of Political
Economy, 89, 392-406.
[34] Ward, A. and T. Mann (2000): “Don’t Mind If I Do: Disinhibited Eating Under Cognitive Load”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 753-763.
41